Turning points on the periphery? The politics of South Africa’s platinum belt strike wave in Rustenburg, Northwest, and Northam, Limpopo: 2012-2014 by Sinwell, Luke
 1
Turning Points on the Periphery? The Politics of South Africa’s Platinum Belt Strike Wave in 
Rustenburg, Northwest, and Northam, Limpopo: 2012-2014 
 
Luke Sinwell 
University of Johannesburg 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Mineworkers have been positioned at the forefront of a new left alliance in South Africa. 
This article questions that assumption. It assesses the politics of workers on a mine called 
Swartklip, part of Anglo Platinum’s operation in Limpopo Province, whose rank and file 
engaged in unprotected strike action in the Northam region (in 2012) before becoming part of 
the longest strike action in South African mining history (in 2014). Drawing from original in-
depth interviews with worker leaders, the article argues that the Marikana massacre, and the 
concessions that workers had won from their employers at Northam, and in the Western Limb 
of the platinum mining belt more generally, was indeed rooted within a militant worker-
driven and democratic culture which laid the groundwork for a shift in the country's broader 
political landscape (notably the rise of the EFF as a political force as well as the shift of 
NUMSA outside the ANC-alliance). However the events at Northam suggest that 
mineworkers in general do not envision themselves as playing a leading role in consolidating 
a left alternative in South Africa's 'new' political formations. 
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Introduction 
 
Since the police killings at Marikana platinum mine in 2012, foundational political shifts 
have occurred in South Africa, opening up spaces on the left of the Tri-Partite Alliance made 
up of the African National Congress (ANC) the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). This has included the 
emergence of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and the so-called ‘NUMSA 
moment’(National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa), whereby the largest trade union 
in the country broke from the Alliance and began the process of forming a United Front to 
challenge the adoption of neoliberal, capitalist or anti-working-class policies by the ruling 
ANC.  According to one analyst, the Marikana massacre was a turning point in the history of 
the country.1 But what this means for the political trajectories of the actual mineworkers who 
led the strikes of 2012 has been relatively under-explored. 
While much scholarly attention has been given to the Rustenburg region and 
Marikana2 in Northwest Province, Limpopo Province has received far less emphasis. In 
particular Northam, a small and relatively isolated platinum mining town in Limpopo 
Province, deserves greater consideration both because it is comparatively under-researched, 
                                                 
1 See P. Alexander. ‘Marikana: Turning Point in South African History’, Review of African Political Economy, 40, 
138, pp. 605‐619. For an analysis of workers’ organisation in the platinum mines from apartheid through the 
transition to democracy and into the present period, see, R. Chaskalson. ‘The Road to Marikana: 
Transformations in South Africa’s Platinum Industry, 1994‐2012’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 42, 5 
(2016), pp. 857‐873. 
2 See, for example, the special issue edited by G. Capps, R. Bush, and D. Moodie, ‘White Gold: New Class and 
Community Struggles on the South African Platinum Belt’, Review of African Political Economy, 42, 146 (2015), 
pp. 497‐682. 
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but also because of the sharpness of political consciousness of mineworkers in the region. 
Northam’s mines, which are part of Anglo Platinum (Amplats), formed an integral part of the 
contemporary mineworkers’ movement. Between 2012 and 2013, its workers were joining 
the independent Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU) and, in 2014, 
workers from the three major platinum companies united in a five months-long strike, the 
longest in South African mining history.3 This paper considers what impact their involvement 
in this lengthy flagship strike had upon the miners’ political allegiances. The article also 
provides insight into how the mineworkers relate to the broader shifts in South Africa’s 
political landscape which their agency helped bring about. 
The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) was abandoned, as I suggest below, not 
because of a wider political consciousness, but rather because the union excluded rank and 
file workers from wage negotiations. The main concern of the workers from 2012 to 2014 
was the question of the ‘living wage’. NUM was pegged as a bad negotiator and out of this 
failure emerged a democratic worker-driven militant culture first in the form of worker 
committees and then (in 2014) under the auspices of AMCU.  The support for the EFF, and to 
a lesser extent NUMSA, in the region is not based on ideological commitment, the article 
suggests, but is primarily instrumentalist and, importantly, confined within a relatively 
narrow militant (yet democratic) trade union culture. The mineworkers did have broader 
discussions about the ANC, but this was limited primarily to the perceived role that the party 
played in the killing of mineworkers on 16 August 2012.   The evidence presented in the 
article indicates that workers joined worker committees and later AMCU because they were 
perceived as more democratic and worker driven and could bargain more effectively over 
their wage demands. 
Exploring the in-depth case study of one company, in Northam, the article 
demonstrates that mineworkers’ agency changed over time as a result of exclusion from wage 
negotiations rooted in the limitations of the then dominant union – the NUM. By tracing the 
origins and historical development of the strike wave (which began in the Rustenburg 
platinum, and then spread to Northam) the article also suggests that the changing nature of 
popular agency was not the result of an attempt to move towards an alternative or left 
political project, nor was it embedded within a kind of socialist consciousness. Lenin’s 
approach resonates: ‘The working class spontaneously gravitates towards socialism; but the 
most widespread (and continuously and diversely revived) bourgeois ideology none the less 
spontaneously imposes itself upon the worker to a still greater degree.’4 On the one hand 
workers engaged in militant and democratic strike action which potentially offered a radical 
politics which would extend into a broader political movement for the working class. On the 
other their ideology reflected the narrow confines of ‘economism’ or what Lenin terms a 
conservative trade union consciousness bound within the existing capitalist system. 
This article draws from original in-depth interviews, mostly in 2016, with mineworker 
leaders at Swartklip as well as news reports and other documents, in order to investigate 
stages of development in the thinking of mineworkers based at Swartklip. It is rooted within a 
                                                 
3 Anglo Platinum, Impala and Lonmin are the three largest platinum mining companies in the world, located in 
the bushveld complex which stretches from Rustenburg in North West South Africa to Limpopo and into 
Zimbabwe. The area contains more than 80 per cent of the world’s platinum. For an extensive discussion of 
the political economy of the ‘boom’ of the South African mining platinum industry from the mid‐1990s until 
the late 2000s, see G. Capps. ‘Victims of its own success? The Platinum Mining Industry and the Apartheid 
Mineral Property System in South Africa’s Political Transition’, Review of African Political Economy, 39, 131 
(2012), pp. 63‐84.  
4 V.I. Lenin, What is to be Done? [1902], in Collected Works, Volume V (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1961). 
L. Sinwell and S. Mbatha, The Spirit of Marikana: The Rise of Insurgent Trade Unionism in South Africa 
(Johannesburg, Wits University Press, 2016). 
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much larger project that has been undertaken by myself and several researchers since 2012 on 
the origins and historical development of the contemporary mineworkers’ movement.  I used 
interviews and observations which were drawn from my sustained contact with Amplats 
worker leaders in both Rustenburg and Northam over a period of five years, to gain a unique 
understanding of worker politics in the region.   
This much larger project involved me training a research assistant to undertake 
research in my absence.  For both of us, fieldwork required substantial patience, and on many 
days we waited hours simply to speak to or spend time with mineworkers. Our intention was 
not only to collect archives, conduct interviews and then simply report our findings to an 
academic audience.  We took a more ethnographic approach by spending as much time as 
possible with mineworkers in their own social settings: cooking together, eating, driving, 
having informal conversations, listening to speeches at mass meetings and, in the most trying 
of times, visiting leading mineworkers while they were in jail (on trumped up charges of 
public violence). During a relatively short period in 2013, we lived with one of the key 
activists in the area in his spare room in Siraleng (in Rustenburg), a mining community just 
outside of Khuseleka, Amplats.  It was there that we met several worker leaders from 
Northam, about an hour’s drive north of Rustenburg.  These contacts assisted us in 
conducting in-depth, rigorous interviews with other informants. I therefore draw from aspects 
of this broader empirical research project in order to supplement the research I undertook in 
2016 in Northam. 
Building upon the historical work of Philip Bonner, this study examines the process 
of social transformation through the lens of workers outside of the major metropoles.5 
Northam lies in a peripheral region, where the western limb of platinum extends from what 
may be called the centre, that is the Rustenburg region in the Northwest. The article extends 
Dunbar Moodie’s important historical work on the Northam region of the platinum belt 
dating back to the 1990s and early 2000s,6 by revealing the dynamics of worker mobilisation 
there during the unprotected platinum belt strike wave of the early 2010s, that had already 
engulfed the Rustenburg region. 
The following section provides an initial overview of events in the platinum belt since 
2012. It then situates mineworkers’ ongoing struggles within the literature on the major 
political shifts that have occurred since Marikana, including NUMSA’s break from the ANC 
alliance and the emergence of the EFF. The section indicates that mineworkers were at the 
forefront of the collective agency that contributed to structural changes to the political 
landscape in South Africa. And yet the empirical evidence presented in the core of the article 
suggests that mineworkers to do not envision themselves as playing a leading role in the 
‘new’ political formations that they helped give rise to. 
 
Initial overview of events 
 
South Africa’s platinum mines experienced an unprecedented wave of upheaval 
between 2012 and 2014. Workers at the three platinum giants – Amplats, Impala and Lonmin 
– each undertook extensive unprotected strikes in 2012. By the end of January 2012 at 
Impala, worker unrest had spread beyond the informal collective of rock drill operators 
(RDOs) and virtually the entire workforce had downed tools.  That first strike ended on 3 
March and the RDO’s pay was increased to R9,000.  Discontent with the NUM came to a 
head at Impala because the union opposed the popular unprotected strike.  As was not 
                                                 
5 P. Bonner, ‘History and the Here and Now’, Social Dynamics: A Journal of African Studies, 39, 2 (2013), pp. 
159‐166.  
6 D. Moodie, ‘Making Mincemeat out of Mutton‐Eaters: Social Origins of the NUM Decline on Platinum’, 
Journal of Southern African Studies, 42, 5 (2016), pp. 841‐856. 
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unusual in South African mine strikes, substantial violence was used against strike breakers 
and several deaths occurred. By the end of the strike, management had fired 18,000 of the 
striking mineworkers. This effectively ended their union membership. About 11,000 others 
had resigned as NUM members at Impala by 30 March 2012. The perceived shortcomings of 
the union at each of the three major platinum mining companies, especially its failure to 
defend workers subject to dismissal for engaging in unprotected strikes, provided the 
immediate structural conditions in which informal worker committees arose, and a 
mineworkers’ movement took hold.7 
Amplats took a few months longer to join the industrial action of 2012, which 
eventually spread across the platinum belt. Notoriously, on 16 August of that year, 34 
mineworkers were gunned down at Marikana by the police while demanding what they called 
a ‘living wage’. Of the three strikes, Amplats in Rustenburg held on the longest. The October 
2012 strike action at Amandelbult and Swartklip – Amplats mines in Limpopo Province – is 
intimately linked to the strikes in Rustenburg, where the strike wave originated.  At that time, 
Amandelbult and Swartklip employed in the region of 20,000 mineworkers. 
The NUM, once a social movement union,8 was now seen by many rank and file 
workers to be in the pockets of management.  By 2013, the vast majority of workers across 
the entire platinum belt had joined AMCU and in 2014 the union led an intensive five-month 
strike. The workers were demanding a living wage of R12,500 across the platinum mines. 
AMCU, with President Joseph Mathunjwa at the helm, emerged victorious in 2014. It is now 
the dominant union, at least in the Rustenburg platinum belt, but also in Northam. 
A few notes on union membership will provide the reader with context. On a national 
scale, AMCU’s membership increased from about 10,000 members in 2011 to about 120,000 
in 2013, and in the platinum sector as a whole AMCU grew to 70 per cent of the workforce.  
In that year, the NUM dropped from more than 50 per cent to about 20 per cent membership 
in the sector (having lost the vast majority of its members to AMCU).9 Between 2011 and 
2015, the union lost about 40 per cent of its members overall which fell from just over 
300,000 to under 200,000.  At a central committee meeting held in Pretoria in June 2016, the 
NUM’s general secretary, David Sipunzi noted that, ‘Our drop was mostly affected by the 
incident [unprotected strikes and police killings] in Rustenburg, where we experienced most 
membership losses’.10 
Both the worker committees (of 2012) and AMCU’s democratic 2014 strike were 
paradoxically supercharged by the Marikana massacre, which was arguably intended to quell 
popular resistance. The massacre, which many mineworkers believed was endorsed by the 
ANC, transformed the political identities of tens of thousands of mineworkers. The result was 
growing distance between them and the tri-partite alliance, providing the possibility that the 
                                                 
7 For a description of this strike wave and the most comprehensive study of Impala platinum mine during this 
period see C. Chinguno’s, ‘The Shifting Dynamics of the Relations between Institutionalisation and Strike 
Violence: A Case Study of Impala Platinum, Rustenburg (1982‐2012)’, PhD thesis, University of Witwatersrand, 
2015.  See also Chinguno’s, ‘The Unmaking of Industrial Relations: The Case of Impala Platinum and the 2012‐
2013 Platinum Strike Wave’, Review of African Political Economy, 42, 146 (2015).  
8 D. Moodie. ‘Becoming a Social Movement Union: Cyril Ramaphosa and the National Union of Mineworkers’, 
Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa, 72/73 (2010), pp. 152‐180. 
9 Lonmin’s Labour Relations Update, 2013 in N. Nieftagodien, ‘South Africa’s New Left Movements: Challenges 
and Hopes’, in M. Paret, C. Runciman and L. Sinwell (eds), Southern Resistance in Critical Perspective: The 
Politics of Protest in South Africa’s Contentious Democracy (London and New York, Routledge, 2017), p.178. 
10 H. Giokos and Z. Mahlati, ‘Struggling NUM has Lost 40% of Members’, 3 (June 2016), available at 
https://www.iol.co.za/business‐report/economy/struggling‐num‐has‐lost‐40‐of‐members‐2029959, retrieved 
8 May 2018. 
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union would be an important, if not integral, part of the new left political formations which 
were in their infancy in 2014 when mineworkers sustained five months of strike action.11 
Two important ‘tectonic shifts’ had occurred after the Marikana massacre, both of 
which continue to have important implications for mineworkers’ political identities and for 
the building of an alternative left movement outside of the framework of the ruling ANC.12 
First is the EFF, an anti-capitalist, black consciousness political party that was launched in 
2013 in Marikana. The Commander-in-Chief, Julius Malema, indicated that he and his 
colleagues chose to launch the EFF at the mountain in Marikana since mineworkers had died 
for their ‘economic freedom’.  Many mineworkers, especially those who joined AMCU, have 
since developed a firm relationship with the EFF.  This is in part because the EFF manifesto 
officially adopted mineworkers’ radical demand of R12,500.  This amount was more than 
double an ordinary mineworkers’ salary at the time and it was the same demand for which 34 
mineworkers struck and were killed on the mountain in Marikana. 
In the 2014 national elections, when the EFF gained more than one million votes 
(about six per cent of voters), the party became official opposition to the ANC in the 
Northwest Province. Here, many mineworkers moved out of the ruling party and joined them.  
In the 2016 local government elections, the EFF won 8.3 per cent of the total votes in the 
country.  It won Ward 26 (which includes Marikana), having obtained near nearly 58 per cent 
of the vote, while the ANC still managed to wield just over 34 per cent.13 In her research on 
the EFF Marikana branch, Essop indicated that the leadership of AMCU and the EFF 
‘overlapped’ and that there remained a ‘visible convergence’ between the two 
organisations.14   While there has been potential to create genuine links between 
mineworkers’ ongoing mobilisation and the EFF, Nieftagodien has been more pessimistic: 
‘For all its radical rhetoric and penchant for public spectacles, the party remains an amalgam 
of populism and vanguardism, aiming to impose its predetermined programme on youth and 
the working class as a whole’.15 
A second aspect of the ‘tectonic shift’ with important implications for South Africa’s 
left politics and beyond is the breaking of NUMSA from the ANC alliance. With the decline 
of the NUM, NUMSA became the largest trade union in South Africa with approximately 
350,000 members.  At the end of 2013, the union made a decision to end its ongoing support 
for the ruling ANC, citing Marikana’s massacre as one key reason. This set the stage for a 
historically momentous process which led to the union being expelled from the COSATU and 
forming a United Front to bring together workers and community members across the 
country.16 
As ‘an explicit, union-led attempt to overcome working-class fragmentation’, Paret 
has posed questions about the United Front including:  
 
                                                 
11 L. Sinwell and S. Mbatha, The Spirit of Marikana: The Rise of Insurgent Trade Unionism in South Africa 
(Johannesburg, Wits University Press, 2016). 
12 Nieftagodien, ‘South Africa’s New Left Movements’, pp. 171‐188. 
13 T. Essop, ‘Populism and the Political Character of the Economic Freedom Fighters – a View from the Branch’, 
Labour Capital and Society, 48, 1 and 2 (2015), p. 234. 
14 Essop, ‘Populism and the Political Character of the Economic Freedom Fighters’, p. 229. 
15 Nieftagodien, ‘South Africa’s New Left Movements’, p. 185. 
16 See S. Ashman and N. Pons‐Vignon. ‘NUMSA, the Working Class and Socialist Politics in South Africa’, 
Transforming Classes: Socialist Register 2020’, 20 (October) 2015, available at http://www.nuvole.it/wp/8‐
numsa‐the‐working‐class‐and‐socialist‐politics‐in‐south‐africa‐2/, retrieved 8 May 2018. For a discussion on 
the fragmentation of the labour movement and the political implications in South Africa, see, A. Beresford, 
South Africa’s Political Crisis: Unfinished Liberation and Fractured Class Struggles (New York and Hampshire, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 
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On what basis is it possible to forge unity between unionized workers, the casually 
employed and the unemployed? What are the points of commonality, and what 
obstacles stand in the way? To what extent is each side interested in building common 
struggles?17  
 
Initially, both scholars and activists were understandably hopeful about the mineworkers’ 
involvement in this process. Given their militancy in 2012 and the fact that they operated 
outside of the traditional unions, it did not seem far-fetched to conclude that it could be 
possible to unite mineworkers and their independent union (especially AMCU) in a common 
struggle with the broader working class including other trade unions, precarious workers, 
students and communities.  Pons Vignon and Ashman hinted that, ‘NUMSA and AMCU may 
now form some kind of alliance, particularly as NUMSA has stated it will organise 
mineworkers’.18 There are few if any scholarly texts, however, that seek to uncover 
mineworkers’ own political identities in relation to these two iconic shifts in the broader 
South African political landscape.  Gentle has perhaps offered some of the most sober 
analysis of these political developments, concluding that the EFF and the ‘NUMSA moment’ 
‘are indices, products, outcomes, not driving forces, of this changing political landscape’.19 
This article builds upon and substantiates this astute observation. 
The killing of mineworkers, alongside the failures of the existing union, led workers 
to turn against the tri-partite alliance – in particular what workers viewed as the ‘twin’ 
ANC/NUM collaboration.  As the case of Northam demonstrates, workers tended to join the 
EFF since it adopted a radical approach to the attainment of ‘Economic Freedom in Our 
Lifetime’. In response to the way in which workers were excluded structurally from engaging 
the NUM around wage negotiations, they created their own committees and then joined 
AMCU which offered a militant union through which to address their demands.  
Although the ‘NUMSA moment’ resulted in part because of the events which 
unfolded in the platinum belt, when the United Front was formed out of this initiative 
mineworkers were not predisposed to becoming involved.  This is because they were 
centrally concerned with attaining higher wages through negotiations and extended strike 
action. The term ‘economic unionism’ provides a useful starting point from which to 
understand AMCU as a union and therefore its relative lack of involvement in the United 
Front as well as electoral politics in the form of the EFF: 
 
Independent unions which confine their activities to the workplace (and are market 
focussed). Their sole interest is the improvement of the working conditions of their 
members, and they may be highly institutionalised, usually conservative but at times 
militant (such as airline pilots’ unions) – but only to use their monopoly power to 
defend their own narrow interests, whether or not they transgress the interests of other 
members of the working class.20 
 
The following sections trace the origins of mineworker militancy in relation to changing 
historical circumstances, including those that were introduced by the killing of mineworkers 
in Marikana, in order to provide a deeper understanding of mineworkers’ identities. I then 
                                                 
17 M. Paret, ‘Working‐Class Fragmentation, Party Politics and the Complexities of Solidarity in South Africa’s 
United Front’, The Sociological Review, 65, 2 (2017), p. 268. 
18 S. Ashman and N. Pons‐Vignon. ‘NUMSA, the Working Class and Socialist Politics’, no page. 
19 L. Gentle, ‘What About the Workers? The Demise of COSATU and the Emergence of a New Movement’, 
Review of African Political Economy, 42, 146, p. 676. 
20 D. Pillay, ‘Between Social Movement and Political Unionism: COSATU and Democratic Politics in South Africa’ 
(unpublished paper, Witwatersrand University, 2013), p. 13. 
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highlight the significance of these changes in relation to present and future political 
trajectories both within and beyond the platinum belt. 
 
The Marikana Massacre 
 
While there is a significant amount of existing scholarship about the Marikana massacre and 
surrounding events, what remain to be explored are the ways in which the massacre helped 
create the pre-conditions for mass mobilisation.21  Indeed, events at Marikana transformed 
the political identities of tens of thousands of mineworkers who moved out of the dominant 
union, the NUM, and in many cases, the tri-partite alliance more generally. This shift in 
politics, as we shall see however, was largely instrumentalist. Since the NUM and ANC were 
viewed as sell-outs and, in the mineworkers minds, even killers (because of what happened to 
strikers on the mountain in Marikana), they had virtually no choice but to join an alternative 
political organisation, the EFF, as well as a different trade union (AMCU). These two 
formations were in turn strategic and successful in terms of the ways in which they tapped 
into mineworkers’ existing demands and feelings of betrayal. 
This section offers insight into the changing identities of  several individual leaders at 
the mines in Northam, 100 kilometres north of Rustenburg, and highlights the ways in which 
the massacre changed their political identities.  We will first discuss Phumlani Kauta who 
was born in the Eastern Cape at Flagstaff in the early 1980s. After he had completed 
engineering courses, he was told that there were jobs at the mine, by an old man who Kauta 
says was like a father to him. So he moved in illegally with him at Makhulu Hostel at 
Swartklip mine: ‘They called us Imbabala meaning “people who do not belong here”’.22 He 
first became an electrical assistant until obtaining a relatively elite job as a diesel mechanic 
from 2009. During this time, and up until 2012, he and many of the men he spent time with in 
and out of work were NUM and ANC members.   
His cousin was on the mountain in Marikana when 34 mineworkers were killed there.  
Kauta, of course, did not take this lightly. On the one hand, he took it personally. On the 
other, he became part of a new and dominant collective force that would oppose the tri-partite 
alliance, especially the ANC, but also COSATU’s second largest affiliate, the NUM.  
Like many other mineworkers in the Western Limb of the platinum belt, he left NUM 
and the ANC following this event and joined AMCU and the EFF.   After Marikana, he 
indicated, ‘most of the members [of NUM] were angry about what was happening … we 
decided to join AMCU after what we saw on TV and after we saw [President of AMCU, 
Joseph] Mathunjwa on TV, that he was on our side’.23  He also joined the EFF and became 
one of its leading regional members of the Waterburg region in Thabazimbi.   
Like many others, he questioned the ANC’s leadership in a democracy under which 
striking employees were killed in such large numbers in a small space of time. According to 
Kauta: 
 
                                                 
21 See, for example, P. Alexander, T. Lekgowa, B. Mmope, L. Sinwell and B. Xezwi, Marikana: A View from the 
Mountain and a Case to Answer (Johannesburg, Jacana Media, 2012). 
22 Unlike in the larger research project discussed in the methodology section of the introduction, all interviews 
with workers from Northam were in‐depth, lasting in the region of one hour.  Unless noted otherwise in the 
footnotes, they were conducted by either Siphiwe Mbatha or me for a project on workers’ mobilisation and 
demobilisation in South Africa’s platinum belt.  The interviews were conducted in either English or isiXhosa 
and they were transcribed verbatim into English for the purposes of this and other academic work. These 
quotes are drawn from an interview with Phumlani Kauta (referred to here as Kauta) in Northam on 19 June 
2016. 
23 Interview, Kauta. 
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I decided not to follow NUM and ANC – I quit and I joined the EFF and I am an 
active member of the EFF and after I joined I tried to stand up and say guys we have 
no other alternative . . . we talked about how do we mobilise and how do we get more 
members to join ‘coz we could see that the ANC is not longer with us, they are 
against us.24 
 
Kauta and a handful of others created the first structures of the EFF before the national 
elections of 2014.  He recalled: 
 
The first guy I met came with 12 berets at Swartklip then and I bought one and [a 
man named] KB bought the second one and we were the first people to wear them and 
people asked where we got them and a guy called Mahloko that I see in Parliament 
now gave me 10 berets and I drove to the place where we used to gather and there 
they bought them and some were asking for membership forms to sign and most guys 
in Swartklip signed the membership forms for EFF so that’s how EFF was started and 
we had weekly meetings of the whole of Thabazimbi.25 
 
Bricks Luzuko Ngwini was also born in the Eastern Cape at Flagstaff. One of six 
children, his father worked at the mines and, in need of a job, he came to Northam to live 
with his father.  On 21 December 2009, Bricks obtained a job as a welder. By 2016, at the 
time that we interviewed him, he had become a Rock Driller Operator. For Bricks, the 
Marikana massacre, ‘was very painful beyond what words can express because we saw how 
our government revolted against us [as strikers]’.26 
A younger mineworker in his 30s, who became one of the key leaders of the workers’ 
committee (and later AMCU), was known by his fellows by the unusual nickname of Fats.  
To this day, he likes a drink out on Friday nights at the nearby taverns where he socialises. 
He became an RDO at Swartklip in early 2011. Soon thereafter he decided to join the NUM 
and was also active in the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL), but the 
Marikana massacre led him to leave both the ANC and the then-dominant union at the mine. 
In fact, like each of the other three mineworkers, he joined the EFF. According to him, 
Marikana conscientised the mineworkers of Northam: 
 
… we didn’t actually understand what was happening in Rustenburg while the people 
were on strike [there at Impala] but after that thing of Marikana that’s when we 
started to see that, oh this Marikana thing is something that involved the mineworkers 
actually and that mineworkers are starting to wake up and see that the South African 
economy is only [sic] dependent on the mining industry.27  
 
Titus Setlhletsi was to become the AMCU branch chairperson of Swartklip mine at 
Angloplatinum in the Northam, Limpopo region. Born on 31 July 1977 at a village called 
Tseoge in Marokweng in the North West Province of South Africa, Titus is the son of a 
farmer. His family moved to the Northern Cape in 1982 when he was in grade six since there 
was a drought at his birthplace.  He completed his matric (high school final exams) in 1997 
and by the late 1990s he had an internship as an artisan at Finsch Diamond Mine, 165 
                                                 
24 Interview, Kauta. 
25 Interview, Kauta. 
26 These quotes and those that follow are drawn from an interview with Bricks Luzuko Ngwini in Northam on 
20 July 2016.  
27 These quotes and those that follow are drawn from an interview with Fats (his preferred name which he is 
popularly known as) in Northam on 16 June 2016. 
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kilometres to the west of Kimberley in the Northern Cape. From the early 2000s, Titus began 
to work at Swartklip. 
From Setlhletsi’s perspective, the killing of mineworkers at Marikana was important, 
but there was something else that drove them to action – wages: 
 
We are actually sympathising with Marikana… but the main thing was the living 
wage.  We believed that what we are earning is not sufficient and we are working 
very hard. We [are] taking a lot of ore, they are getting money out of the ore, but we 
are only paid a few cents.  We [are] working for hand to mouth, we don’t do anything 
else… we just get something to eat [only]… that’s how our strike started after we 
decided to show our dissatisfaction to the company.28 
 
The origins of the demands at Marikana, like at Northam, was around obtaining 
compensation for hard work and low pay, not building a left alternative that could united 
various trades in a common struggle against capitalism. Still, the events at Marikana had far-
reaching effects on the political identities of mineworkers in Northam: it delegitimised the 
ANC (which was viewed as having a hand in the massacre) and further engraved the idea that 
the NUM opposed their own interests. This latter point was compounded, as we shall see in 
the section that follows, by the exclusive nature of the NUM which helped create the basis for 
an autonomous worker committee that represented the workforce to take hold.  
 
The Origins of the Strike at Swartklip, Northam 
  
Workers at Lonmin intensified their strike action as early as the evening of the Marikana 
massacre on 16 August 2012 and continued for more than one month, until 18 September. 
Equally important, the Marikana massacre was the straw that broke the back of the NUM, 
which came to be viewed by many workers in the Western Limb of the platinum belt as 
having played a role in the massacre of mineworkers.  These historical conditions did not 
immediately lead workers to join existing formal political organisations or trade unions. At 
this stage, worker committees were formed to represent the rank and file in wage negotiations 
only.  As important as AMCU was in creating a new home for disgruntled workers, it was 
more of an afterthought at this stage. The exclusive nature of the NUM therefore helped 
provide the basis upon which an independent committee was formed in Northam, at 
Swartklip in particular, but these conditions were insufficient and, as we will see in the 
section which follows this one, it required agents from Rustenburg to rally the forces in 
Northam.   
 What appeared as a major victory at Lonmin on 18 September 2012 (a 22 per cent 
wage increase) prompted other employees in various workplaces across the country over the 
next two months to engage in unprotected strike action in the gold, diamond and coal 
industries. This spread eventually to automobile and truck manufacturing and the public 
sector.  From 11 September 2012, as the Lonmin strike was coming to a close, workers at 
Amplats Rustenburg region began to down tools.  They demanded R16,070, significantly 
more than the R12,500 demand at Lonmin for which workers had died on the mountain. At 
that stage, the nearby Amplats Northam region had not yet mobilised in an overt manner, but 
disillusionment with the NUM was fermenting, 
Much like his counterparts in Rustenburg in the late 2000s, soon-to-be worker leader 
Titus Sethletsi began to conclude that NUM shop stewards at Swartklip ‘were disregarding 
the issues of the workers.  Because if you reported something [to them] that did not sit well 
                                                 
28 Interview, Titus. 
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with the workers they would take their time to respond initially.’29  Titus explained that in 
December 2010 NUM members at the mine had agreed they would have a strike around 
wages.  The strike began at the end of December, but when he arrived back to work from 
leave in January, the NUM office bearers had intervened: ‘the NUM said the strike can only 
last for seven days because the law only allows for that’.  When Titus and other NUM 
members personally reviewed the Labour Relations Act (LRA), they concluded that their 
union leaders had betrayed them: that there was nothing in the LRA, in fact, which stipulates 
this seven-day limit. 
 He nevertheless continued to be a member of the NUM and he soon became a trusted 
worker leader in the mine.  He represented workers at disciplinary hearings and became a 
full-time Health and Safety Representative at Swartklip, holding meetings with the employer 
every Tuesday. By later in 2012, the challenge of the AMCU rival was felt at Northam. 
Workers decision to join AMCU was not motivated by a wider political consciousness, but 
rather it was instrumentalist. Workers felt abandoned completely by NUM and they simply 
needed an alternative union to represent them at their workplaces. He recalled that at the 
time: 
 
There was so much unhappiness in the whole mine such that at times we were taken 
for questioning by the mine to the extent that NUM in their mass meetings would talk 
about AMCU – if we asked [legitimate] questions they would say if you want to join 
AMCU you can join AMCU and by then already there were strikes in [and] all over 
Rustenburg. So there was much unhappiness by the workers of how they NUM was 
treating them and how they would not regard their issues when they elevated them to 
their offices.30 
 
Nonetheless, while the Amplats Rustenburg region began their fierce unprotected strike 
demanding R16,070 on 11 September 2012, Amplats Northam region only later began to 
prepare for action.  Mineworkers in Northam were not themselves prepared to take the lead in 
collective action, nor were historical conditions in Northam at that point sufficient to support 
such action..  
This changed in October 2012. By the end of September, in the Rustenburg region, 
the strike at Amplats had grown to 80 per cent of the workforce.  The Citizen reported nearly 
100,000 employees were on strike nationwide.31 This was probably more to do with worker 
mobilisation around Marikana than it was about the mineworkers at Amplats. Following a 
crackdown by 1000 South African Defence Force (SADF) soldiers, workers ended their 
strike at Lonmin on 18 September 2012, with a 22 per cent wage increase. The CEO of 
Amplats issued an ultimatum stating that, if workers did not go back to work, the company 
would be forced to dismiss about 21,000 workers. By 5 October the threat became a reality 
when Amplats announced that it would dismiss 12,000 workers who did not attend the 
hearings to which the company called them.32 
 
Management’s Threats Empower Strikers 
 
This decision by management created a new context within which strikers would enact their 
agency, shifting immediate historical events onto another set of tracks. It created the 
preconditions for the lengthy strike at Northam. Management’s threats ironically empowered 
                                                 
29 Interview, Titus. 
30 Interview, Titus. 
31 Sapa, ‘Strikers Swell to 100,000’, The Citizen, 28 September 2012, p. 23. 
32 S. Bega, ‘Mines May Follow Amplats in Dismissing Strikers, Saturday Star, 6 October 2012, p. 4 
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the strikers whose militant and democratic culture could not easily be swayed. This culture 
continued to be sustained outside of any trade union in part because of the way in which 
workers had been excluded from the existing union, the NUM.  
According to one leader from the Amplats Rustenburg region:  
 
He [CEO Chris Griffith] gave an announcement that 12,000 people are dismissed for 
going on an unprotected strike ... Those words gave us courage and we became very 
strong … we are going forward because we are already fired, so there is nothing [else] 
that we can do.  We will stay on strike until they give us our money.33 
 
The strike in Northam was both an indirect extension of Marikana and also a critical outcome 
of the stoppage at the Rustenburg section of the mine. The Amplats Rustenburg leaders, in 
particular a man called S.K. Makhanya and another named Thebe Maswabi, became part of 
the driving force behind the strike action at Northam.  Makhanya, corroborated that the 
firings, ‘made us move to Limpopo [Northam] because we saw that we are already fired… so 
those announcements and SMS’s [sent by the company] that say that we are fired are the ones 
that made our strike to be solid.’ He also indicated that the workers had concluded that ‘we 
don’t want to go back to work until our demands are met’. They had witnessed the fact that 
‘Impala went on strike and they came back with something’ and asked themselves, ‘How 
come we can go [back] to work empty-handed?’34 
The group of mineworker leaders resolved that the strike was at a critical turning 
point and that solidarity from other mines was needed. Makhanya recalled that they drove to 
Northam and ‘went on the ground to talk to them’. He said to a group that was already 
meeting at Rustenburg section ‘we are engaging with the company. We are having this kind 
of problem, but you are not on strike, you are working. We want [you] to get the reality that 
if the company puts the money for us, it mustn’t put money for you. Because you are not on 
strike’.35  
The leaders from Rustenburg requested the workers at Northam to select leaders of 
their shafts to represent them. By the second week of October, both Amandelbult and 
Swartklip were on strike. Titus Setlhletsi, in Northam, summarised a situation in which 
disgruntled workers mobilised and ‘requested everyone not to go to work’. Thereafter, ‘we 
met at the central place called Richard shaft in Swartklip.’  
The intention was to march to management’s offices (in both North and South, these 
are the two mining segments in Swartklip) to hand over a memorandum of grievances.  They 
gave management seven days to respond. ‘From there’, Setlhletsi remembered, ‘we said we 
needed some people who can go and represent us, that’s when seven people were elected and 
I was [one of those] elected to lead them’.36  Setlhletsi recalled that he was chosen because of 
his consistent historical involvement in assisting workers as a Health and Safety 
representative who rarely failed to follow through with tasks.   Both NUM members and 
NUM shop stewards were present.  
One informal worker leader (who was not elected as one of the seven representatives), 
interpreted the industrial action as an ‘NUM strike because there was no AMCU at the 
time’.37  In reality, however, it is clear that although the strike was primarily organised by 
                                                 
33 This quote is drawn from an interview conducted with a leading mineworker on Amplats on 17 August 2013 
in Rustenburg. He did not wish to be named so in this article I call him Tumelo, a pseudonym. 
34 The quotes in this paragraph are drawn from an interview conducted with a leading mineworker named S.K. 
Makhanya on 9 August 2013 in Siraleng, Rustenburg. 
35 Interview, Makhanya. 
36 Interview, Setlhletsi. 
37 Interview, Kauta. 
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NUM members, it was independent from unions, including the NUM. Several thousand 
workers, or almost the entire workforce (of Swartklip) were present on that day, on 3 October 
2012.  They marched more than 2 kilometres from the northern segment of the mining region 
to the southern and the seven who were elected handed in the memorandum to the 
management (in this case Mr. Tendaupenyu and Mr. Philips Schoeman respectively): 
 
… the main thing we wanted to do was to brief [them] workers about the demands we 
wanted to put forward and check if they agreed with the demands and I think we got 
an agreement to put the demands forward and [we] agreed to march peacefully to the 
management office[s]… and handed in the memorandum to say we won’t stop 
striking until he [the management official] met our demands.38 
  
The seven-day period for management to respond was lapsing fast and workers were 
becoming increasingly dissatisfied.  The Star reported that on 9 October 2012, Dan Sebabi, 
COSATU’s Provincial Secretary in Limpopo at the time, had hoped to have a positive 
intervention.39  His car was stoned, however, allegedly by striking mineworkers outside of 
Dichaba shaft where 2000 workers had met. The strikers indicated that COSATU had failed 
them, ‘We have a strike today because NUM, which is affiliated to COSATU, has failed us. 
COSATU, just like NUM, is not welcome because we’re on a strike as workers and not under 
any union’.40 The mineworkers’ informal spokesperson summarised the manner in which 
workers, much like those in the Rustenburg region, felt betrayed by their union and had few 
other options but to mobilise independently: ‘Instead of defending us against mine 
management, NUM has befriended them, and they wine and dine together. How do they 
protect us against their friends and how do we trust them again after they have failed to get 
our real grievances addressed’?41 
The strike continued throughout the month of October 2012 and worker committee 
members from each shaft at Amplats Rustenburg region and the Northam region met 
regularly outside parking lots next to a Shell Garage in the centre of Rustenburg.   Mass 
meetings, often consisting of thousands of workers, were also held outside each shaft on a 
daily basis. They met with management whose offer to provide workers a R2000 once-off 
hardship allowance was refused on the basis that it did not begin to address workers’ 
demands for a living wage of R16,070.  
By the 27th of that month, COSATU organised a march through Rustenburg in an 
attempt to ‘reclaim Rustenburg’. Amplats workers from both Northam and Rustenburg 
deliberated about whether or not to take part.  They concluded: 
 
We are going to that rally because we are still members of the NUM. And as members 
of NUM, we are bound to be part of that rally because it’s being called for us. And 
maybe it’s an opportunity to come face to face with the top office bearers of 
COSATU and tell them directly why we are against NUM.42 
 
Key leaders of both COSATU and the NUM including Zwelinzima Vavi, Frans Baleni, 
Sdumo Dlamini and Blade Nzimande appeared to be jovial when they marched through 
                                                 
38 Interview, Setlhletsi. 
39 P. Tau, ‘Violence breaks out at Limpopo mine’, The Star, 10 October (2012).  
40 Interview with Amplats mineworker Thabo Dube (appears in Tau, ‘Violence breaks out’). 
41 Interview, Setlhletsi. 
42 This quote is drawn from an interview with Bheki Buthelezi, who was working closely with workers at 
Amplats in an attempt to extend their strike.  The interview was conducted in Rustenburg on 17 September 
2013. 
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Rustenburg with about 1,000 unionists in a respectful attempt to ‘Reclaim Rustenburg’ inside 
the Alliance.43 But anti-NUM workers, who had arrived in red NUM t-shirts in order not to 
be identified, took them off at the start of the rally and began to burn them. One worker who 
was present felt the message they sent at the rally to the then General Secretary of COSATU, 
Zwelinzima Vavi, was ‘Don’t say you [COSATU] will reclaim Rustenburg.  You don’t own 
Rustenburg. We own Rustenburg’.44  The Amplats workers from the two regions concluded 
that they needed to hold a mass meeting of their own.  About 10,000 mineworkers attended 
the march at Olympia Stadium on 10 November 2012.  
The strikers left the rally with confidence that they would emerge victorious.  In 
response, Vavi made an alternative plan and requested to meet with the workers’ committee 
so he could negotiate a deal with management on their behalf.  They met on 12 November, 
two days after the workers’ rally and on 18 November the strike ended.  The strike, by that 
time, was not as powerful as it had been previously: some operations were dropping out and 
others were getting tired. They agreed to a salary adjustment of R400.  As one worker 
explained, ‘The workers committee came with R400 in two months and then NUM comes 
with R400 in 12 months’.45 The key issue that led workers to leave NUM and form their own 
committees, was their wages, not a larger political consciousness. The mobilisation was 
independent of any trade union at the time and later laid the foundation for AMCU’s own 
militant trajectory. Wage negotiations were to continue in 2013, and workers hoped that they 
would then be able to reach an agreement that put their salaries somewhere near R16,070. 
 
The Transition to AMCU: The Longest Strike in South African Mining History 
 
Worker committees created the conditions in which a union, AMCU, could take hold 
in the platinum belt. It was also a shift that involved workers’ own decision-making and 
agency as they would now, in their own view, be at the forefront of the new union. AMCU’s 
identity was forged around a militant democratic project focused on radical increases in 
wages. Indeed they would adopt a living wage demand of R12,500, uniting the three platinum 
mines in a five-month strike, but they would fall short it linking to other unions (and other 
aspects of the working class) in an attempt to forge unity in a common anti-capitalist 
struggle. Management at Amplats, in both Rustenburg and Northam, needed a legitimate 
group with which to engage that was legitimate in the eyes of the workers, or – in their view 
– risk anarchy. The company therefore issued ‘interim access’ to what they called the 
‘Interim Committee’, made up of worker committee members from shafts in both regions.  
An agreement presented to the worker committee leaders stated that ‘the granting of 
the interim access to the Interim Committee as set out in these guidelines was a precondition 
to the return to work by the supporters of the Interim Committee’. Management made clear, 
however, that they were not granting organisational rights, but merely providing access to 
‘office facilities and basic amenities.’ The agreement concluded by insisting that the 
committee would ‘have to be registered as a trade union in accordance with the provisions of 
                                                 
43 G. Marinovich, ‘War: COSATU VS Amplats Strikers. Battlefield: Rustenburg’. Daily Maverick Online, 
https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012‐10‐27‐war‐cosatu‐vs‐amplats‐strikers‐battlefield‐rustenburg/. 
Accessed: 24 October 2017. 
44 This quote is drawn from an interview with Godfrey Lindani (nicknamed ‘Mabanana’) on 18 September 2013 
in Rustenburg. 
45 This quote is drawn from a mineworker leader who did not want to be named. It was conducted on 9 June 
2013 (by Botsang Mmope), in Rustenburg. 
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the Labour Relations Act of 1995 (“the LRA”) prior to it being eligible for recognition at the 
operations of Rustenburg Platinum Mines.’46 
 All Rustenburg Amplats units (mine shafts) were granted up to three part-time 
representatives and one full-time representative.  This also included the Northam units, 
Amandelbult and Swartklip. The purpose of these representatives, from the perspective of 
management, was to resolve conflicts in the workplace in order to ensure productivity. The 
interim access was to end on 31 December 2012.47  Setlhletsi, who would become the AMCU 
Chairperson of Swartklip shaft explained the process through which workers joined AMCU: 
 
… the management advised us either to form our own union or we must join another 
union. During the strike [of 2012] we had already asked everybody that whoever 
wanted to join AMCU was welcome and forms were available. It was not forced but it 
was a choice for individuals to join or not to join but fortunately most of the people 
joined there, then Anglo agreed that they must submit the forms and they will send 
somebody to come and verify the forms … then they agreed and processed the stop 
orders.48 
  
By February 2013, workers had gained recognition rights under AMCU and by the middle of 
the year AMCU had eclipsed the NUM as representative of Amplats, Impala and Lonmin. 
Titus provided an in-depth explanation of what happened in late 2013 and the January 2014, 
in the lead up to the five-month AMCU strike: 
 
After the [December 2013] break we came back and held mass meetings and 
announced that we had continued to negotiate with the company during the December 
to try and resolve so that we don’t go on strike, but the company was adamant to say 
that, ‘no’, they will not give us what we want and we learned that they are actually 
used to agreeing with the NUM union for the things that the workers do not want.  So 
in January we reported to the workers that the company is still adamant and the 
workers said, ‘no’, if the company does not want to give us what we want – let us 
have the central mass meetings so that we can either vote for a strike or take a 
different approach. We took that to the President of AMCU and he called a mass 
meeting in Rustenburg where we were bused to the [Olympia] Stadium… [and] he 
asked if we will be going to strike or must we sign the offer that was on the table. 
Then the workers said no we go on strike.49 
  
 On 23 January 2014, the great strike began. The decision to join AMCU led to a 
situation in which, under the leadership of its president, Joseph Mathunjwa, workers at the 
three platinum companies undertook a collective struggle for R12,500. At a speech in a mass 
meeting of about 3,000 workers a few days before, Mathunjwa offered a critique of 
capitalism when he put forth the logic behind the impending strike: 
 
Comrades, our future was determined even before we were born by the capitalists. By 
the time our mothers were expecting babies, the capitalist class was very jubilant 
                                                 
46 The quotations in this paragraph are drawn from an unpublished Anglo document entitled, ‘Rustenburg 
Platinum Mines Limited: Interim Access Guidelines for the Own Mines Managed Operations’ (2012), pp. 1‐2.  
47 Anglo Document, ‘Interim Access Guidelines’. 
48 Interview, Setlhletsi. 
49 Interview, Titus. 
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because another slave was on its way.  We [are] the slaves. Comrade, it’s up to us that 
we continue the way the things are continuing, or we change the course.50 
 
Indeed, mineworkers still desired a living wage, but beyond speeches from one or two 
leaders, I could find little or no evidence whatsoever of an attempt to link the attainment of a 
‘living wage’ to broader working class struggles. They held meetings daily to report back to 
each other about what was happening, and also to give themselves confidence in numbers to 
strengthen their collective action. After all, police brutality against mineworkers had not 
ended on the day of the Marikana massacre.   
About one month into the great strike of 2014, during a mass meeting of about 800 
mineworkers at Swartklip mine outside B Hostel, on 10 February 2014, Shadow Ncedani was 
shot dead by a police officer with an R-5 rifle. In the midst of the strike, tensions had been 
mounting and rumours spread that mineworkers were preparing to destroy mining company 
property. Kauta recounted the horrific details of the event: 
 
They shot him [Shadow].  What I saw while standing on the pile of rock is that those 
guys came in a police quantum van and we stood there knowing that they can’t climb 
the rock mountain and that guy as the leader went straight to them to say, ‘no don’t 
shoot these guys [the mineworkers on strike], they are just singing’.  Those two 
policemen … shot him and he tried to run away, they shot part of his chin off and at 
that moment I ran away myself.51 
 
He remembered that it was raining, which may have added to the sombre mood, but people 
did not have umbrellas.  The mineworkers present were beginning to mourn and also 
questioned why the killing needed to happen: ‘we ended up singing and some of the guys 
were crying ‘coz [sic] of what had happened yet there had been no vandalism done on the 
mine, yet we lost our guy Shadow’.52  
The workers fought against hunger amongst themselves and their families and faced 
ongoing police repression. One worker leader expressed the deep level of motivation and 
sacrifice at a mass meeting outside one of the mines in Northam called Ditshaba, when he 
told the rank and file: 
 
They must stop panicking about our child and wife at home whom they think will die 
at home of hunger. Just tell them simply that we have committed ourselves to go on 
strike now. So if they feel these pains that our children will die of hunger they must 
leave our child [to] die at home.53 
 
While the worker committees which led the strikes of 2012 had been absorbed into 
AMCU and in other cases marginalised, AMCU nevertheless took on a democratic character 
throughout the 2014 strike, representing militant workers that had only become more 
resolved since the Marikana massacre took place two years earlier.  The union simply would 
not bow out of the strike without the consent of the rank and file. As one worker from 
Lonmin indicated, ‘He [Mathunjwa] wanted to get a mandate from us … so he just take[s] 
                                                 
50 Part of a speech by Joseph Mathunjwa, at Olympia Stadium, Rustenburg, 19 January 2014. I personally 
recorded this speech and had it transcribed. 
51 Interview, Kauta. 
52 Interview, Kauta. 
53 This quote is drawn from an interview I conducted with S.K. Makhanya during the 2014 strike at his home in 
Siraleng (in Rustenburg) on 4 May 2014. 
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our mandate as it is’.54 Five months into the strike, the workers and their union settled for 
major increases of R1,000 per year for the next three years (about 20 per cent increase per 
year).  
The length and intensity of the five-month strike was impressive, perhaps even heroic, 
in the eyes of observers who had hope that ordinary people’s agency could play a role in 
transforming structures that exclude the working class from their share in society’s salaries, 
goods and services. A look beneath the surface, however, revealed certain limitations. While 
the Marikana massacre; the creation of independent workers’ committees (which had radical 
demands); the response of workers in the face of managements’ threats to dismiss striking 
mineworkers; and the decision to unite workers at the three platinum mines under the 
auspices of the union, collectively demonstrated workers’ agency and the ways in which they 
have responded in the face of changing historical circumstances, the demands of 
mineworkers over this period have nevertheless remained relatively narrow. The AMCU 
continues to be defined by ‘economic unionism’ – using strike action in order to obtain better 
wages and improved working and living conditions, without being involved in an ongoing 
struggle to transform the lives of the broader working class.55 For example, the President of 
NUMSA, Andrew Chirwa, who had hoped to ally with AMCU workers in order to extend the 
reach of their strike, was prevented from speaking in January of 2014 at the AMCU strike 
launch rally at Olympia Stadium in Rustenburg.56 
Worker after worker who my research team and I interviewed in the platinum after the 
2014 strike ended summarised the difference between the NUM and AMCU: AMCU got them 
money and negotiated on their behalf while NUM sat cosy with management. From 2012, one 
mineworker confirmed that, ‘we changed the union.  The union that we have now is the union 
that is making sure that workers get money.  That other one [NUM] was looking at the 
government, they have shares with the government.  When government says we increase by 
R300 [per year], the union will agree.’ He further elaborated, ‘when we are talking about 
money maybe we say “we want R500”, the government would say give them R250 and you 
must know in the minutes when you sign for money you sign for three years’.57 The NUM was 
incapable, linked to the ruling party (or government) workers asserted, of obtaining major 
increases in salaries.  The militant struggle over a much better wage, for mineworkers only, 
remains the key feature of the contemporary movement which is the subject of this article. 
 
Conclusion - Future Possibilities  
 
This movement, which extended from Rustenburg to Northam, not only transformed wages 
and restored dignity to mineworkers, but also created a broader process of structural change 
in the South African political landscape; arguably it was a ‘turning point’.58 The emergence 
of the EFF in 2013, which adopted the workers’ demand of R12,500 in their manifesto, has 
already brought an important challenge to the ruling ANC.  More significantly perhaps, the 
largest trade union in the country, NUMSA, broke with the COSATU federation in part as a 
result of the Marikana massacre and is now a core part of a new left alliance, the South 
African Federation of Trade Unions (SAFTU), launched in April 2017.  This new worker 
                                                 
54 This quote is drawn from an interview I conducted in Marikana with a leading mineworker named Alfonse 
Mofokeng on 19 September 2014.  
55 Pillay, Between Social Movement and Political Unionism. 
56 This information is drawn from personal communication with S.K. Makhanya, Rustenburg, 19 January 2014. 
57 These quotes are drawn from an interview Siphiwe Mbatha conducted with an anonymous mineworker on 
18 June 2017. 
58 P. Alexander, ‘Marikana, Turning Point in South African History’, Review of African Political Economy, 40, 
138, pp. 605‐619. 
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organisation combines over 700,000 members in over 20 different unions including the 
massive 350,000 strong NUMSA, but it has yet to prove that it is democratically driven by its 
membership. It has also failed to demonstrate that it will play a serious role in organising 
precarious workers who operate outside of traditional union structures.   
Since mineworkers political identities are largely confined to a form of trade union 
consciousness, AMCU is unlikely to play an influential role within SAFTU. The same may 
be said for the United Front which has, since NUMSA’s announcement of its formation in 
late 2013, at best stalled and at worst become moribund. On the one hand, mineworkers have 
helped provide the basis for new political formations (on the left of the ANC) within which to 
mobilise. However, they have remained trapped within the prevailing capitalist system to the 
extent that they were negotiating over the amount of money they should receive in wages.  
Workers’ radical demands in the platinum belt have remained confined narrowly to particular 
workforces or companies.  
 During the several-year period in which I interviewed and observed mineworkers in the 
platinum belt, opposition to the ANC, COSATU and the NUM in particular was at a peak.  This 
was highlighted by the facts that it was dangerous at times to wear red NUM T-shirts outside 
of the shafts where mineworkers pull platinum from the ground and that political party 
representatives other than the ANC leaders were unwelcome at the one-year Marikana 
commemoration which took place below the infamous mountain on 16 August 2013.59 On the 
other side of the spectrum, the EFF’s Commander-in-Chief, Julius Malema, and AMCU’s 
President, Joseph Mathunjwa, have been brilliant at tapping into the political space opened up 
by the state repression (which mineworkers link to the ANC) and the perceived limitations of 
the NUM.   
And yet there are few, if any, signs that EFF is playing a major role in the popular 
mobilisation of mineworkers, other than through the building of electoral support. Moreover, 
according to my ongoing research on the nature of AMCU in the platinum belt since the 2014 
strike, the union has not developed a programme for building democratic worker structures at 
the shaft level that are driven by and accountable to the rank and file.  Once considered by the 
Amplats informal worker committees to be a democratic union, AMCU is in fact proving to be 
deeply authoritarian.   Nor is there any substantial evidence that AMCU, like the vast majority 
of unions in the country, made any substantial attempt to extend beyond their relatively narrow 
boundaries by bringing together workers, communities and students under the United Front. 
SAFTU has also not obtained enthusiastic support from AMCU, thus suggesting that the new 
federation still remains somewhat fragmented in its attempts to incorporate all the largest and 
most militant trade unions in the country.  
 The union’s top down nature may also, in the relatively near future, lead to AMCU’s 
own demise, again creating structural conditions for yet another form of collective 
insurgency, or perhaps even a return to a reformed NUM, which maintains firm institutional 
roots in the platinum belt despite its relative lack of members. An alternative possibility is 
that NUMSA becomes more successful in its recruitment drive in the platinum belt. Finally, 
there is evidence which suggests that on the periphery, in Northam, a new union is being 
formed.  It rejects both the NUM and AMCU’s top-down approach and is based on the 
centrality of direct democracy.  However, it has not held a major public launch and remains 
marginal, even though there is a possibility that disgruntled workers from Rustenburg will 
join this new organisation in an attempt to renew their struggles over wages and improved 
working conditions in the region.  
                                                 
59 This perception is drawn from notes I took at a meeting with the Marikana Support Campaign that included, 
among others, Joseph Mathunjwa and several mineworkers from Marikana.  The meeting took place at St. 
Albans Cathedral in Pretoria on 10 August 2013. 
 18
It should be noted that radical demands and tactics are not necessarily equivalent to 
radical or left politics. Moreover, critiques and disdain for political and worker formations 
come much more quickly, and arguably with greater ease, than left alternatives. It is my 
contention that the vast majority of mineworkers who led the strikes of 2012 and 2014 on the 
Western limb of the platinum belt do not presently envision themselves as playing a leading 
role in forming, or contributing in meaningful ways to, this alternative outside of electoral 
support for the EFF and membership in the still independent AMCU.  
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